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INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND NATIONAL TRADITIONS: 
JAPANESE CAPITALISM IN THE  21ST CENTURY 
 
Ronald Dore 
Professor, Department of Political Science, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
 
 
 
What I have in mind in speaking to this rather ponderous title is the following. Japan, for a 
variety of reasons, has evolved a form of capitalism which in many respects is very different 
from the type normally described in textbooks. It also seems, in the circumstances of the modern 
world, to be rather more efficient. 
 
Hitherto, there has been no problem about different forms of capitalism coexisting in a world in 
which national economies did remain for many purposes self-sufficient units which surrounded 
themselves with a variety of barriers to the free flow of factors and products. But, increasingly, 
those barriers are being removed. Perhaps we are moving back to a new period of neo-
mercantilism, but the history of the world over the last two centuries - not to mention the 
accelerated cheapening of transport and communications in the last two decades - does suggest 
that, although the 'borderless global economy' of the futurologists' book titles may still be some 
way away, that is the direction in which, over the long run, the world is moving.  
 
Will it be possible in a more integrated world economy, for different kinds of capitalism to 
continue to coexist?  Will there not be pressures towards much greater uniformity (pressures 
from impersonal market forces, and pressures from governments and business interests 
demanding 'level playing fields' all over the world)?  And if that happens, towards what sort of 
form will those pressures cause the system to gravitate? Shall we all learn to organize ourselves 
the Japanese way? Or will the Japanese learn to play it the Western textbook way? 
 
 
4 JAPANESE CAPITALISM   
A different form of capitalism 
 
My first task, clearly, has to be to establish that Japan can really be said to have a 'different' form 
of capitalism. Different from what?  From 'Western' capitalism, presumably. But beware. When 
Anglophone writers talk about 'Western industrial society' what they are really talking of, 
usually, is British-American society. And it is the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, of course, 
which provides the empirical referent for the English language economics and management 
textbooks which dominate the world textbook market. In practice, however, while in many 
respects - particularly in the way financial markets work and relate to the industrial sector, but 
also in labour markets, and in the modes of government intervention - Britain and America are 
indeed very similar, they are rather different from, say, Germany or Italy. In some respects those 
latter countries are a good deal more similar to Japan than to Britain or America. So, to simplify 
the subsequent discussion, let it be agreed that when I talk about Japan being different, I mean 
different from the Anglo-Saxon model, or, more specifically, since it  remains the dominant 
force in the world today, from the United States. 
 
To be sure, an astute Martian, trying to reconstruct the nature of our societies after they became 
extinct and having only the books of legal statutes to go on, might conclude that any differences 
between Japan and the United States were quite marginal. The laws of property and contract, 
corporation law, bankruptcy provisions, labour law; these are all quite similar. 
 
That is indeed true; but there are, to begin with, subtle differences in the laws themselves; anti-
trust provisions, for example, the relative priority claims of employees and other creditors in 
bankruptcy proceedings, and so on. But more important are the differences in what the law does 
not prescribe; how people go about making contracts - what are considered the social 
preconditions for doing business with people - what you decide to spell out in contracts and what 
you don't; how far you have recourse to legal proceedings to enforce contracts, for example. Or, 
to take another area of difference - the actual distribution of ownership rights and the 
conventions established in society governing the relative power of owners and managers; the 
sources of finance; the distribution in practice between labour and capital - or rather the 
distribution as among wages for employees, interest and dividends for the providers of capital 
and investment in the future of the firm. 
 
I suppose if one wanted a single-sentence summarizing epitomization of the difference between 
Japanese and American capitalism, it could probably best be phrased using the word which Marx 
and Engels borrowed from Carlyle for the Communist Manifesto, namely 'the cash nexus'. You 
will recall how they said that, with the end of feudalism, the ties of obligation which had bound 
people together in the old regime were broken, and in the new society of capitalism the only 
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thing which bound man to man was the cash nexus - the impersonal arms-length bargain in 
pursuit of self-interest. 
 
One might put the difference in quantitative terms, even if the actual difficulties of measurement 
would be formidable. In Japan, a much smaller proportion of economic transactions are of the 
pure cash nexus type; a much higher proportion are embedded in social relationships of trust and 
mutual obligation. But this 'embedding' is not of the traditional type of which Polanyi wrote - 
embedding in ties of an 'ascriptive' type. It is embedding in social relations which are created by 
the repetition of economic exchange itself; relations which are a function of 'achieved' status. 
 
I would like to elaborate this statement under five headings: 
 
1. Personnel practices, as management experts would put it; 'the nature of the labour 
market' in economists' terms; 'the nature of the implicit labour contract' in the 
jargon of the lawyer. 
 
2. The social perception of the enterprise. 
 
3. The character of interfirm transactions. 
 
4. Inter-competitor cooperation/collusion. 
 
5. The role of government as creative umpire. 
 
Employment Practices 
  
There are several general ways of characterizing the Japanese system - that it is organization-
oriented rather than market-oriented; that it extends to all workers conditions of service enjoyed 
only by privileged managerial workers in the American or British system; that it extends to 
private businesses patterns of employment which, even for managerial workers, are found only 
in the civil service, the police and the army. In practice this means: 
 
1. The convention of lifetime employment. All firms prefer to recruit, and  - the large firms 
succeed in recruiting, the majority of their workers - and especially that 30 per cent of the labour 
force who are university graduate workers - right at the beginning of their careers, and keeping 
them for the rest of their working life. People are sought, not for their trained ability to do certain 
jobs, but for their general ability - their likely capacity to learn to do a variety of jobs over the 
course of a working lifetime. 
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2. The emergence of a unique ability-grading educational system. Precisely because employers 
are looking for 'general ability' and because most personnel managers consider the intellectual 
dimension of that general ability to be reasonably well measured by school achievement, the 
educational system has become an ability-labelling system to a degree of refinement rarely found 
elsewhere. This is not simply a rough elite/non-elite grading of institutions as is found in Britain. 
University faculties are graded according to the difficulty of their entrance examinations as 
measured by a common scale (evolved by the commercial manufacturers of practice mock tests). 
This strongly reinforces the lifetime employment system. It means that the top corporations can 
be sure they are getting the top people. It also means that the graduate of a fourth-rate university 
is likely to stay with a fourth-rate firm, because he is unlikely to better himself by moving; if he 
couldn't, with his record, make it into a third-rate firm at the start of his career, he is even less 
likely to do so later. 
 
3. Employee-management. Boards of directors are the top employees in a bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Appointment to the board is the last stage of the career of the high-flyer manager who has moved 
slightly ahead of his entry cohort at each previous stage. It occurs only within a fairly narrow age 
span; usually the early fifties. There is only minimal importation of outsiders on to boards, and 
they are usually appointed to represent the interests, not so much of shareholders in general, as 
of, say, the company's lead bank, its major supplier or distributor, a company with whom the 
firm has a major joint venture, etc.  
 
4. A highly predictable promotion pattern. As is just suggested, a propos directors, promotion up 
the corporate hierarchy for (generalist) managers (and, similarly, up the supervisory ranks for 
manual workers) occurs within relatively predictable seniority constraints. It is work 
performance which determines who gets ahead fastest, but the margin of advantage is limited by 
seniority. Typically it might be, for example, that of an intake aged 22-24, only the most able 10 
per cent get promoted to the rank of section chief by the age of 33. Then, at the next level, 
perhaps only 5 per cent become a division chief at the age of 44, and only one of them, if any, 
becomes a director seven or eight years later. 
 
The pattern is familiar to anyone who knows a British-type civil service. It has the very great 
advantage that it keeps inter-personal competition to a minimum. The best strategy for a good 
career is hard and cooperative work for the company; there is little chance of manoeuvring into 
your boss's job. 
 
5. Person-related rather than job-related wages. I said 'organization-oriented' rather than 
'market-oriented'. With the lifetime commitment people are not often in the market. In a system 
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of internal promotion they are not being compared, as candidates for particular jobs, with 
competitors coming in from the outside market. Likewise, pay is not determined by the price, 
determined by the forces of supply and demand, that a particular skill commands in the market. 
People are not paid 'the rate for the job'. They are paid according to their position on an 
incremental scale. Which scale they are on is determined by educational level/worker grade; their 
position on it by age, seniority and performance assessment. 
 
6. Enterprise trade unions. Given these other characteristics, it would be surprising if the labour 
unions were market-oriented - if they were, as typically in Anglo-Saxon capitalism, unions 
which unite people in the same craft or profession; people who are selling the same skill in the 
market and have a common interest in keeping up the price at which that skill is sold. Instead 
unions unite all the people who have sunk their futures in the same firm and have a common 
concern with how that particular firm treats its workers, with how it settles the proportion of its 
revenues it pays in wages, the proportion going to investment, etc. 
 
7. Training. In an American-type market-oriented system, training enhances the skills an 
individual has to sell in the market. It is reasonable that he should bear a large part of the costs - 
or the state, acting collectively on behalf of individuals. In the Japanese organization-oriented 
system with pay scales which are not closely tied to job-functions or skills, it is reasonable that 
the enterprise invests in the training of its lifelong members. 
 
8. Welfare. Lifelong membership in the organization produces a parallel difference in the 
organization of social security, housing and leisure facilities. State and local government 
provides less, the enterprise provides more, in Japan than in the American model (though the 
difference is not so marked as with Britain, the other exemplar of the Anglo-Saxon model, where 
the state has many of the functions left, more individualistically, in the US to private insurance). 
 
9. Self-definitions; the bases of social status. In market-oriented societies people asked to 
identify themselves by their work role (rather than their family or leisure or political role) do so 
primarily in terms of their occupation or profession; in organization-oriented societies by their 
organizational membership; 'I work for Mitsubishi' rather than 'I'm a plumber, an architect, a 
choreographer, a rodent operative'.  This dimension of conscious self-perception in turn helps to 
reinforce the other features - the lifetime commitment, the enterprise unions structure - listed 
above. 
 
10. Blurring of internal stratification. Many of the features listed above apply partially to elite 
managerial workers in Anglo-Saxon firms - IBM is a notably 'Japanese' firm in this regard; so 
are some of the British elite firms like Unilever, BP, etc. In the Japanese firm it applies to 
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everyone enrolled as a 'regular' or 'permanent' worker, blue-collar workers included. Stratal 
divisions are only the divisions between people on different pay-scales, which the system tends 
to de-emphasize by minimizing any other symbolic status divisions - of length of annual 
holidays, work times, social security provisions, access to dining facilities, etc. This enhances 
the sense that the firm is a community of people. 
 
Social perception of the firm 
 
Why are there hardly ever hostile takeovers in Japan - when it is perfectly possible to buy shares 
in the stock market, gain a controlling interest and turn out the existing management in Japan as 
in other countries? The answer lies, not in the legal but in the social constraints on such action. 
As one Japanese writer remarked: 'taking over a firm simply by the power of money seems too 
"dry" (dorai) to us Japanese'. 
 
What he was getting at is that to the average Japanese businessman, a firm is primarily a 
community of people rather than a piece of property that its owners can do what they like with. 
 
How that came to be the dominant perception is a very interesting historical question. Of more 
practical import is the 'functionalist' question of what sustains that perception today. Two things 
stand out. The first is the employment system described above. Getting a 'regular' job in a 
Japanese firm is very much more like joining a community than entering into a temporary 
contractual arrangement.  
 
The second is the way Japanese firms are financed. They use a lot of debt; that portion of their 
finance depends on the relations managers have, not with anonymous shareholders, but with 
bank managers - people like themselves. But much the same applies to their equity too. Most 
firms have got a very substantial portion of their shares locked up in the safes of other firms - the 
firms they do business with - many of whose shares they themselves hold. These 'mutual stable 
cross-holdings' are never traded in the market without consultation with the firm whose shares 
they are. With a half to three-quarters of their shares locked up in this way, managers can afford 
to be relatively indifferent to what speculators, trading their remaining 'floating shares', are doing 
to their share-price in the stock market. 
Interfirm transactions 
 
A lot of American labour economics is written as if the labour market were like the sugar 
market; you buy as much of it as you need at the time you need it, at a price determined by 
supply and demand at the time. No labour market is just like that, but a lot of managers, 
hankering after free hire and fire, think that that is the way it ought to be. But obviously not in 
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Japan. The Japanese labour market, as described above, is about as far from that paradigm as one 
can imagine any labour market being. 
 
Very much the same difference applies in business dealings - between supplier and customer 
firms. The way an automobile company buys its windscreens and door handles and carburettors 
in Japan is a long way from the 'draw up specifications, put out to tender among competing 
suppliers, choose the best buy' sort of recipe which has long dominated the rational-business-
methods textbooks. Relations tend to be long-term and stable, involving a lot of technical 
cooperation - frequently engineering cooperation on a project long before the price the supplier 
will get has been bargained out. Japanese businessmen tend to divide their world into business 
partners with whom they have a mutual-trust relationship of this sort, and strangers with whom 
they deal at arm's length. Members of the latter category can graduate to the former over time. In 
their dealing with non-Japanese firms the time required may be a good deal longer. 
 
Inter-competitor cooperation 
 
Japanese economists speaking to American audiences are apt to portray Japan as a fiercely 
competitive economy whose success is to be attributed to the entrepreneurial vigour and healthy 
lust for profits of Japanese private enterprise managers - never to anything so unfair as 'Japan 
Inc.' type government direction or government subsidies. 
 
The competitive spirit is certainly there. Competition there certainly is. The major electronics 
companies work their engineers to nervous breakdowns trying to get some new hyper-
gimmicked video recorder on the market a few weeks ahead of the competition, thereby gaining 
two or three percentage points of market share. 
But this picture of fierce market competition needs some qualification. First, in general, Japanese 
firms are very good at perceiving, agreeing, and more-or-less honestly sticking to agreements 
about, where enlightened self-interest dictates that the line can best be drawn between 
competition and cooperation. Secondly, a good deal of the cooperation would in a society as 
suspiciously anti-trust as the United States, be counted as anti-competitive and anti-social 
collusion. Thirdly, agreements to cooperate are frequently based on an acceptance of hierarchy; 
since the economy settled down to its postwar pattern in the 1960s small firms have rarely 
harboured ambitions to displace big firms, but big firms, likewise, are hesitant about trying to 
drive small competitors out of business. 
 
The first point about 'cultural capacity': why should it be greater than in other capitalist 
countries? A greater preference for friendly rather than hostilely rivalrous relations? A higher 
level of the kind of rationality which calculates the probable consequences of alternative courses 
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of action more finely over longer future time periods?  Because of the proximity in time of the 
elaborate guild organizations which were crucial to the organization of the Tokugawa economy 
only 120 years ago?  
 
All of these things perhaps, but whatever the roots, the effects are apparent. In expanding 
markets, particularly consumer goods markets, competition can be fierce. In stagnant or 
contracting markets, particularly producer goods markets, 'excessive competition' is avoided. 
Sometimes collusive price-fixing is clearly at the expense of the consumer, clearly illegal, and 
sometimes investigated and punished by the Fair Trade Commission. Very often, however, it is 
recognized as having some 'public interest' justification and blessed by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in a formal 'regulated cartel' arrangement. Investment coordination cartels in the process 
industries, temporary production cut-back recession cartels and permanent capacity reduction 
agreements are examples. When the refinery industry fell on hard times because of over-
capacity, slower economic growth and efficient energy-saving, it was allowed to operate an 
informal ban on gasoline imports in return for maintaining a price structure - cheaper kerosene 
and dearer gasoline than the market would otherwise have produced - which was deemed to be in 
the public interest. 
 
Another manifestation of the capacity for cooperation can be seen in the strength of industry 
associations which perform a wide range of technical and marketing services and, especially, 
information-gathering services. 
 
As for the hierarchy point, the stability of market share structures is remarkable. List the top 10 
firms in almost any industry in 1980 and much the same 10, with only minor variations in order, 
are likely to be on the list in 1990. Creeping up on the firm ahead, increasing market share a 
percentage point or two at a time, is what competition is about. Fierce battles for dominance - as 
in the 1970s 'war' between Suzuki and Yamaha, the two motorbike manufacturers from the same 
town - are both rare and spoken of with distaste by the average Japanese businessman; excessive 
and mutually self-destructive competition. 
 
Government as creative umpire 
 
The way a government can best promote growth, according to the neo-classical economists, is by 
keeping out of the way of its creative entrepreneurs. It should limit itself to upholding the legal 
structures which ensure the security of property and the enforceability of contracts, and 
providing those collective public goods like defence and information services and education 
which the market alone would not produce. The 'Japan Inc.' image suggests that the Japanese 
government has played a role far removed from that ideal - the role of controlling strategist, 
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directing investment, allocating tasks to business firms, enforcing cooperation here, competition 
there. 
 
The truth is somewhere in between. The cartel arrangement for the refinery industry cited above 
is a good example. The government - especially the agency with jurisdiction over the bulk of 
manufacturing industry, MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry - has been 
umpire in controlling the cartel arrangements of particular industries, adjudicating between 
producer interests and consumer interests according to some criterion of 'national interest' - in 
the formulation of which, it has to be said, the competitiveness of the Japanese nation in world 
markets (coinciding, largely, with producer interests) has held high priority. It has been creative 
in many respects. It has often taken the initiative in making such cartel arrangements. It has 
played a major role in promoting wide discussion of, and creating a national consensus about, 
the strategic directions in which the economy should be restructured. It has often used credit and 
fiscal policy to favour growth in the targeted directions. And it has provided the entrepreneurial 
initiative, organizational frameworks, and a certain amount of cash subsidy for the promotion of 
a wide range of 'pre-competitive' industrial R & D. 
 
Three questions: Efficiency, Desirability and Survivability 
 
I trust the point has been made by now that the way Japan works and saves and consumes and 
transacts business differs in many important respects from the way economic textbooks say that 
capitalist economies ought to work. So, to be sure, does the way America works too. But the 
American economy is much closer to the textbook model, and a wide range of Americans 
consider the textbook model as the efficiency ideal - which is not true of Japanese workers or 
businessmen. The German and the Italian economies deviate from the textbook rather more than 
the American, and in many respects are closer to Japan. But let us here confine ourselves to the 
world's two biggest economies. After all, it is primarily Americans who write the world's 
textbooks. 
 
So let us take the fact of difference as established. Three questions arise. Which is the more 
efficient?  Which is the better system?  Which will win out? 
 
Which more efficient?  On the efficiency issue there would not seem to be much doubt. Look at 
growth rates. Look at the steady increase in Japan's share of world trade - at the fact that an 80 
per cent revaluation of the yen caused hardly more than a blip in the steady advance of Japan's 
exports. Consider the implications of the fact that Japan invests over 30 per cent of GNP per 
annum, the US less than 20 per cent, or of the fact that of patents granted in the US only 4 per 
cent were granted to Japanese in 1970, but 21 per cent in 1988. 
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But that does not settle the issue. It is still sometimes argued that the strength of the Japanese 
economy lies in the competitive vigour of individuals and firms, the capacity for hard work, the 
frugality that produces high savings rates, the capacity for conscientiously fulfilling duties. All 
that is what makes the Japanese economy efficient, in spite of the irrationalities and rigidities of 
a system which stops markets from doing their proper work. These are just legacies of feudalism 
which time will eventually erode. 
 
That the Japanese economy benefits from the work habits and savings habits of its people can 
hardly be denied, but that the institutional framework in which they work and save is such as to 
frustrate rather than promote their good habits seems improbable. The features of Japanese 
economic organization described above are becoming widely known; the flood of 'learn from 
Japan' books is having its effect on business schools. The Director of the Sloan School at MIT, 
Lester Thurow, gave this year's Marshall lectures in Cambridge. His theme was the superior 
competitive efficiency of the Strategic Conquest Firm as against the Profit Maximizing Firm - 
read typical Japanese and typical American firm respectively. 
 
Two features stand out in most accounts of why the Japanese system confers a competitive edge; 
the capacity for long-term investment, and the pattern of employee motivation. Both are 
intimately related to the fact that most employees can and do expect to continue working for 
their firm until retirement, and to the character of the firm as a self-governing community of 
people rather than as a piece of property of the shareholders. And the pattern of enterprise 
finance is, of course, an essential precondition for those features. 
 
Which better?  The Japanese system constrains consumers to spending only about 65 per cent of 
national income. Americans get to spending about 10 per cent more of theirs. On the other hand, 
the purchasing power of the Japanese consumer - and, indeed, the Japanese wage-earning 
consumer - has more than doubled since 1970. In the US the average wage has actually fallen in 
real terms over that period. Also, the distribution of income in Japan remains much less unequal 
than in the United States. 
 
 
So, except for those Americans - lawyers, business executives, doctors, brokers - who value the 
chance to win a half-million-dollar-a-year salary (which almost nobody can do in Japan), there is 
little on material grounds to tempt one to prefer an American-type economy. The crucial 
questions are about choice and commitment; untrammelled freedom and belonging. If you want 
to keep your options open, change jobs when you want to without much loss of pay and status, 
keep yourself to yourself at work and say no to the foreman who wants you to do overtime, 
dump your suppliers when somebody else offers a better deal, put your business school training 
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to work by mounting bids for companies with juicy undervalued assets - if you want, in other 
words, the fullest opportunities for individual profit-maximization and individual self-
expression, then America is the place to go - especially if you are above average in talent, 
education and chutzpah. If you value security and the sense of being trusted, can swallow the 
fact that the job choice you made in your twenties has tracked you for life, and do not mind 
being constrained by community pressures in the use of your time and your money, then you 
may well prefer Japan. 
 
Which will win out?  I do not mean by that question to add fuel to chauvinist sentiments. I do not 
mean what a recent American television film meant when its narrator called for a 'new Desert 
Storm' to prevent America losing its new war - the economic war against Japan. What I am 
talking about is not a battle between states but between institutions, between systems of 
organization.  
 
My question assumes that the world economy continues to become more integrated, with 
national frontiers being less and less effective constraints on any economic actors - rather than 
retrogressing to protectionist trade blocs which may indeed turn the battle between systems into 
a battle between states. Increasing integration means increasing interaction, increasing 
competition and thence, increasing homogenization of system components. It is unlikely that the 
world of 2050 - or 2030, for that matter - will have room for more than one capitalist system. 
Whose will that world system resemble most?  The American or the Japanese? 
 
The way increasing competition leads to increasing homogenization of system components is, of 
course, through the Darwinian process of survival only of the fittest. The a priori answer to our 
question, then, should be: the more efficient Japanese. 
 
And one can find justification for adopting that answer in the events of the last decade. The 
Japanese system is spreading in the United States by both of the twin mechanisms of social 
Darwinism; displacement and imitation. Japanese firms have moved into the United States; in 
the automobile industry the already-announced plans of Japanese manufacturers will soon give 
them a 15 per cent share of the market - quite apart from the other 15 per cent or so, taken by 
imports from Japan. At the same time, as exemplified in Ford's After Japan programme and in 
GM's Saturn project, Japanese competition has induced American manufacturers to make 
substantial changes in the way they do business. Just - in - time work organization, team work, 
flexible job definitions, job security, intensified worker training, worker participation in decision 
making, stable long-term supplier relationships, are all part of the current rhetoric of American 
progressive management. The MIT book, The Machine that Changed the World, has become a 
best-seller with its advocacy of even more assiduous adoption of Japanese practices. 
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But might this not be just the swallow or two that do not make a summer? There are several 
arguments against simple extrapolation of the trends just noted into the future. 
 
First, although, as argued above, Japanese competitive efficiency is not just a matter of long 
working hours, hard work and docility towards superiors, those undeniably are among the 
ingredients of success. As the Japanese grow more affluent (and get older - the average age of 
the workforce is rising rapidly) they will surely slow down. We saw, after all, a very similar 
phenomenon in the l950s and l960s when American firms moved rapidly into Europe - both 
displacing European firms and prompting them to imitate American production methods. The 
'American challenge' had a lasting effect on production techniques; productivities were 
improved. But it was a one-shot effect. As American competitive vigour and cash resources 
declined disinvestment began; the takeover process was not sustained. Might it not be so also 
with the Japanese? 
 
Perhaps, but don't count on it. The school and university system in Japan with its overpowering 
incentives for diligent application (sustained by the competition for status more than for money) 
will work to protect the work ethic against the ravages of affluence. For further doubts on the 
necessary connection between affluence and decline of the work ethic, consider recent trends in 
middle-class America. The yuppies on Wall Street who worked all the hours God gives to buy 
that extra BMW they never had time to drive, suggests that the motivating force of status 
consumption - the lust for positional goods - can be as much a motivator of hard work as the fear 
of falling into poverty. 
 
Secondly, whatever has happened in the world of manufacturing methods, there are only the 
most marginal indications - occasional bursts of debate about industrial policy, marginal 
adjustments of the capital gains tax to encourage long-term share-holding, for example - of any 
amendment in the financial and control structures of American capitalism. It is still financial 
experts, trained in business schools in the arts of maximizing shareholder value, who take the 
ultimate decisions - men and women who are likely to see themselves as having a moral duty (as 
well as doing the best thing for their stock options) to veto long-range investment plans when the 
net yield, after allowing for risks and uncertainties, falls below investment in Treasury Bonds. 
Japanese banks may already supply two-thirds of short-term commercial debt in California, but 
their role in the long-term bond and equity financing of American firms is still limited. 
 
That might mean, of course, only that the Japanese system will dominate, in the end, more by 
displacement than imitation. Japanese practices may come to rule in the financing of American 
manufacturing because the bulk of that manufacturing comes to be done in firms of Japanese 
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origin so that the American financial system shrinks with the shrinking of American-origin 
firms. But the trends are too incipient so far for anyone to extrapolate them with much 
confidence. 
 
And it should not be forgotten that there are not only market forces at work, but political forces 
also. The distinction I made above between a battle between states and a battle between systems 
is conceptually sustainable, but as long as the American state continues to defend the interests of 
Americans with a stake in the American system and the Japanese state likewise, the two battles 
are inextricably interlinked. 
 
To begin with, it is through national politics that decisions are taken whether to allow market 
forces to work or not. If the world does move back towards a system of trade blocs with internal 
free movement but severe restrictions on trade and investment across bloc boundaries, then it is 
not the firm-level processes of displacement and imitation which will be the important 
Darwinian mechanisms involved, but the struggle among power blocs. 
 
Secondly, it should not be forgotten that Japan's edge in economic power is counterbalanced by 
American superiority in military power, international political influence and the self-confidence 
at the bargaining table which goes with those things. These resources have been consistently 
used over the last 20 years to pressure Japan into changing the legal and administrative 
framework of Japanese capitalism in ways that have the effect - and are often designed to have 
the effect - of making Japanese capitalism a bit more like American. The so-called Structural 
Impediment Initiative talks of 1989-90 are a recent example of just such an effort - rather more 
sustained and systematic than most.  
 
But it is in the nature of government-to-government negotiations that they can only act on legal 
and administrative structures - that is to say, mostly only on the 'government as creative umpire' 
aspects of the system; agricultural protection, the Large Retail Store Law which protects small 
against big retailers, government procurement practices, cartel arrangements in the construction 
industry, levels of public investment, and so on. Some of the changes American negotiators 
pressed for would alter the incentives for 'defecting' from the norms which govern the behaviour 
of private actors and sustain the existing system - marginal changes in company report disclosure 
rules, for example, or in the regulation of takeover bids or of cross share-holdings. But these 
would only be minor changes, not very likely to produce enough deviant behaviour for the norms 
to weaken. The fact remains that the distinctive character of Japanese capitalism rests, not so 
much on anything very distinctive in legal and administrative structures, as on a distinctive set of 
conventions, implicit understandings, norms of acceptable behaviour. That, for all the leverage 
that American negotiators can muster, and for all the support they can claim within Japan (from 
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the cheap rice lobby, the large retail store owners, stock exchange professionals, etc.) sets 
inevitable limits to the effects that government-to-government negotiations can have. 
 
Perhaps the reader will have firm views on the relative survivability of the two systems. I do not.  
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